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As reform proposals begin to emerge, it 
appears that a continued combination of 
public and private sector solutions will be the 
framework for the health care system going 
forward. Government programs, employer 
sponsored coverage, consumer engagement/
personal responsibility and market-based 
actions are all likely to continue playing a role, 
although structures and emphasis may change.
In developing reforms, policymakers will 
examine each component of the current health 
care system. Among those components is the 
structure of health care benefits. Analyses will 
likely address a series of questions:
• Are benefits optimally designed to maxi-
mize beneficial coverage?
•  Do current benefit structures create appro-
priate incentives for improved health and 
efficiency?
HCFO Efforts 
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s 
Changes in Health Care Financing and 
Organization (HCFO) program is conducting a 
series of activities to explore the role of benefit 
design in reform efforts. Recently, HCFO con-
vened a work group, bringing together senior 
level policymakers, researchers and industry 
experts to explore market innovations in ben-
efit design, describe how they are currently 
being implemented, and discuss the potential 
for expansion. The group also examined what 
organizations of varying sizes and sectors think 
about benefit design. Through this effort, 
HCFO seeks to build the research base and 
expert capacity to assist policymakers in devel-
oping health reform. 
Role of Benefit Design 
Benefit design is one of many components of 
reform. Others include delivery system and pay-
ment reform. Benefit design uses cost sharing 
to signal value and incent positive behavior by 
beneficiaries. However, providers delivering care 
face different incentives and imperfect informa-
tion exists about the quality of care provided. For 
example, providers are most frequently paid to 
deliver services, and the incentives are therefore 
to deliver more, rather than better, services. The 
amount of payment relates to the complexity of 
the service and the amount of time and train-
ing it requires; the amount of payment does not 
vary according to how valuable the service is to 
the patient or the extent to which the service 
contributes to the patient’s improved health and 
functioning. Similarly, the payment amount does 
not vary by the quality of outcomes or services 
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The Issues
This meeting, Health Care Benefit Design, is 
part of a larger health reform initiative conducted 
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s 
(RWJF) Changes in Health Care Financing 
and Organization (HCFO) initiative. The HCFO 
program is supplementing its existing activities 
(grantmaking, convening, and dissemination) 
with a multi-pronged strategy to build the 
research base and expert capacity to assist 
policymakers in tackling topics likely to emerge 
during the upcoming debates about health 
care reform. HCFO is holding meetings, 
commissioning papers, convening work 
groups, and organizing dissemination activities 
that focus on three topics: structuring benefit 
designs, assessing the implications of the 
supply and organization of the delivery system, 
and examining the behavior of firms and their 
workforces regarding insurance choices. To view 
related products as they are released, please 
visit www.hcfo.net.
See companion Policy Report at  
www.hcfo.net/pdf/policyreport709.pdf
provided; only recently have payers experi-
mented with tying payment amount to quality 
in the form of additional payments for high 
quality care. The Medicare program will soon 
be experimenting with payment withholds for 
certain poor quality hospital care (e.g. “never 
events”1 and readmissions2). Beneficiaries 
with insurance coverage are shielded from the 
true cost of care and thus do not have finan-
cial incentives to weigh costs and benefits. 
Perverse economic incentives exist, which 
prevent consumers and providers from jointly 
making value-conscious decisions.
Information to guide decisions is also lacking. 
Information on the relative quality of provid-
ers is limited, as is information to help con-
sumers determine which treatment options 
are most effective for them. However, con-
sumer choices are influenced by providers 
who may also lack sufficient information or 
may have different incentives. The delivery 
system may also impose constraints on the 
available treatment options.  
Because of the variety of economic and 
non-economic incentives inherent in the 
current health care system, benefit design 
is only one of the tools available to incent 
behavior. While it has the potential to be 
an important tool, its impact is likely to be 
modest unless it is accompanied by pay-
ment reform and delivery system change.  
History of Health Care Benefits
While many European countries had some 
form of compulsory, nationalized health 
insurance by 1920, the United States did not. 
There was little support for such legislation 
and, in fact, strong opposition by physicians, 
pharmacists, and commercial insurance com-
panies.3 However, as the demand and cost of 
medical care increased, insurance became an 
attractive solution to ensure that people could 
pay their medical bills. Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield led the way in providing group health 
coverage in the 1930s. Coverage focused pri-
marily on hospital and physician services.
Insurance coverage in the United States, for 
the most part, is obtained through employers. 
The employer-based system emerged during 
World War II when wage and price controls 
prevented competition for labor on the 
basis of increased wages but allowed for the 
establishment of employee insurance plans. 
The favorable tax treatment of employer 
contributions to employee health insurance 
plans further cemented this relationship. 
Employer-based insurance is more accessible 
for full-time employees and employees of 
larger firms. Small employers are less likely to 
offer coverage to their employees and, when 
they do, benefits are typically less comprehen-
sive than those offered by large employers. 
The individual insurance market is small and 
is used most often as a bridge between spells 
of more affordable employer coverage.4 In 
the mid-1960s, the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs launched. Medicare provided the 
elderly with a uniform set of national benefits 
and eligibility standards. Under Medicaid, 
which was created to provide insurance for 
the poor and disabled, benefits and eligibility 
varied by state. More recently, public  
coverage for children was expanded through 
the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP).5
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 
with their structured benefit designs and lim-
ited networks, took hold in the 1980s. HMOs 
expanded health care benefits to include phar-
maceuticals and preventive care. The recogni-
tion that lifestyle is one of the primary con-
tributors to health has led some employers to 
include wellness programs among their health 
benefit options. Smoking cessation programs 
and financial incentives for completing health 
risk assessments and enrolling in weight-loss 
programs are among benefits employers are 
starting to offer their employees.6  The take-
up and success of these types of benefits are 
yet to be realized. Preventive care, care man-
agement, and pharmacy plans became more 
common in the last several years, even in 
indemnity plans, and in 2003 legislation pro-
vided for a pharmacy benefit under Medicare.
As health care costs have begun to rise 
more rapidly, employers are increas-
ingly scaling back their employee and 
retiree insurance benefits.7  Deductibles are 
increasing, and copayments and other cost 
sharing are increasing as well. Individuals 
that purchase insurance in the individual 
market are also moving toward reduced 
coverage due to cost concerns.
A recent analysis of the individual and 
small group products offered by health 
plans responding to the AHIP survey in 
2008 indicates that there is no single “aver-
age” or most-purchased benefit package. 
Rather, benefit choices are spread over 
five to seven relatively common deductible 
offerings. The most frequently purchased 
benefit package (about 25 percent of those 
in the survey) in the individual market 
included a $500 deductible. In fact, only 6 
percent of policies had no deductible and 
more than 35 percent of policies had a 
deductible of $2,000 or more.  The level of 
cost sharing for particular services does not 
appear to differ significantly, indicating that 
in the individual market policies trade off 
increased deductibles for lower premiums. 
While benefits in the small group market 
appear to be somewhat more generous, 
with 20 percent of covered lives facing no 
deductible coupled with a high hospital per 
admission copay (with a mean of $333 per 
admission and higher specialist physician 
copays) and only about 17 percent of cov-
ered lives facing a $2,000 or more deduct-
ible, a large number of individuals do face 
a significant deductible.8  
Tools to Address the Challenge of 
Increasing Health Care Costs
The rapid growth in health care costs has 
spawned innovations regarding benefit 
design and cost-sharing provisions as pay-
ers try to temper health care cost increas-
es.9  This challenge of rapidly rising health 
care costs has resulted in a number of tools 
used by insurers and payers to better ratio-
nalize care. These include:
•  Prior approval
•  Second opinions
•  Tiered pricing
•  Lowest cost alternative
•  Consumer-directed packages with high 
cost sharing
•  Value based insurance designs
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Originally, tools were mostly administra-
tive, preventing the use of “unnecessary” 
services. More recently developed tools 
try to focus incentives on beneficiaries/
enrollees. For example, some employers 
are “thinning out” the coverage available to 
employees or moving to more catastroph-
ic-focused benefit options.10 Others are 
developing packages which emphasize pre-
ventive and wellness services. Consumer-
driven health plans and value based 
insurance designs (VBID) are two major 
directions that have caused consumers to 
focus on value and may serve to extract 
value (e.g. high quality at low cost) from 
the health care system.  
Consumer-Driven Health Plans
Consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs) 
entered the market in the late 1990s and 
were designed to encourage consumers to 
take more direct control over their health 
care decisionmaking. Generally in CDHPs, 
a high deductible health plan is coupled 
with a health spending account, funded 
by a portion of employers’ health benefit 
contribution. The most common accounts 
are health reimbursement accounts (HRAs) 
and health savings accounts (HSAs). 
Consumers who spend down the monies in 
their account in a given year must pay out-
of-pocket until reaching their deductible. 
A key feature of CDHPs is internet-based 
information, available to consumers, about 
provider cost and quality.
Early results from CDHP have been mod-
est. These plans appear to result in reduced 
pharmacy spending11 and physician office 
visits12  but that reduction in care is indis-
criminant, affecting both high and low 
value care. In addition, there are indica-
tions that selection into the plans may play 
a large part in savings.  That is, people who 
are healthier or more activated consumers 
may be more likely to enroll in CDHPs.13  
It appears that the success of this benefit 
structure is dependent on how the plans 
are structured and implemented; a num-
ber of variables can influence consumer 
engagement, spending and utilization, as 
well as potential savings.14  Newer benefit 
designs have attempted to exempt preven-
tive services from the deductible in the 
hopes of reducing barriers to their use, 
subject to Treasury regulations. There is 
little empirical evidence about the impact 
of these new designs on utilization and 
health outcomes.15  
What is clear from these account-based 
insurance designs is that consumers are 
sensitive to economic incentives, and do 
reduce utilization when faced with signifi-
cant cost sharing.  However, the appar-
ent inability of consumers to distinguish 
between necessary and unnecessary care  
is worrisome.  
Value-Based Insurance Design16
While innovation in health care will con-
tinue to drive new therapies, many experts 
believe that our capacity to pay for all new 
improvements simply does not exist.17 One 
solution: support those therapies that are 
shown to have value. Efforts are underway 
to shape insurance benefits to encourage 
the use of health care that provides value 
to the patient. 
To date, the VBID framework has largely 
been applied in the context of encouraging 
the use of certain pharmaceuticals through 
reductions in consumer cost-sharing. The 
assumption underlying VBID is that, if cost-
sharing is reduced, consumers will be more 
likely to engage in preventive behaviors and 
comply with chronic disease management. 
Pitney Bowes has been a leader in the devel-
opment of these types of benefit structures. 
In 2002 they created a reduced cost-sharing 
incentive to promote better medication 
adherence; limited published results showed 
reduced emergency department use by 
diabetics and slower cost growth overall. 
A study of patients enrolled in a disease 
management program with Active Health 
showed adherence increases associated 
with co-payment elimination or reduction. 
More research will be needed to determine 
whether the limited early successes translate 
into sustained improved health outcomes or 
health care cost reductions.
Candidates for VBID are those services for 
which the clinical benefits are supported 
by evidence, financial incentives to patients 
can influence their use, and there is “value” 
to improve health outcomes or reduce 
costs.18 The pharmaceutical focus of the 
work to date on VBID is important but 
limited. VBID might also relate to increas-
es in cost-sharing for low value services 
—either services that have little impact on 
quality or are not of high value. However, 
there are a number of challenges in identi-
fying candidate therapies and services for 
VBID and operationalizing these policies.
Clinical effectiveness.  While a large number of 
therapies and services have been identified 
that improve health outcomes, the extent to 
which they provide benefit depends on the 
clinical characteristics of the patient.  Few 
therapies provide clinical benefit to every-
one regardless of health or genetic status. 
Appropriately targeting therapies to the sub-
set of the population who can most benefit 
is a difficult task in VBID, since the insurer 
often does not have enough clinical data to 
selectively apply differential cost sharing.
The time horizon is also important to 
consider in assessing clinical effective-
ness. Most insurers consider short term 
effectiveness, since the standard insurance 
contract is one year. However, this under-
estimates the potential effectiveness of pre-
ventive services and chronic disease main-
tenance, since these services often have a 
longer time horizon. Kaiser Permanente 
is one exception, covering preventive 
services and chronic disease maintenance 
better than most plans, because Kaiser 
Permanente maintains their enrollee rela-
tionships for a longer period of time.   
While existing efforts at VBID have 
focused on pharmaceuticals and par-
ticularly at encouraging the use of certain 
therapies, there is potential for designs that 
might discourage the use of services with 
low clinical effectiveness as well. However, 
identifying those therapies and appropri-
ately targeting the incentives will be chal-
lenging. Initial steps have begun with the 
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recent passage of the stimulus package 
under which $1.1 billion has been allocated 
for comparative effectiveness research. 
This includes the establishment of a coun-
cil to coordinate the research efforts and 
advise the administration.  
Financial incentives influence use.  The premise 
behind VBID is that reducing cost sharing 
will incent consumers to use certain thera-
pies. While common sense would argue in 
favor of this, there is little empirical evi-
dence justifying this assumption. Most of 
the evidence comes from research that dem-
onstrates that consumers are price-sensitive, 
and are less likely to use services that are 
expensive. However, there is little evidence 
that consumers can respond to nuanced 
incentives promoting more of certain ser-
vices or fewer of others. Further, given the 
reliance on professional determination, it 
may be unrealistic for financial incentives 
to counterbalance the physician’s recom-
mendation. That is, financial incentives to 
patients may not be sufficient to counter 
financial incentives to providers to drive 
utilization. However, VBID may be more 
successfully used to incent entry into the 
system, or to reinforce the recommenda-
tions of physicians for therapeutic care.
Value (benefits exceeds costs).  Determining 
value is difficult. First, the perspective of 
value must be clarified.  Should value be 
considered in the context of the insured 
individual, the payer, or society? While the 
individual should be in the best position to 
assess the benefit of a service to improved 
health, the individual often does not have 
enough clinical information to assess 
benefit, nor does the individual have an 
accurate assessment of the cost, and so the 
“value” determination is skewed. In addi-
tion, the individual must incorporate their 
own preferences with medical advice and 
other societal input (such as direct to con-
sumer advertising). A number of initiatives 
have tried to provide more information to 
individuals to aid in the decision-making, 
with limited success. Further, payers may 
not have sufficient information to gauge 
benefit to individuals, and must make deci-
sions about benefit at the aggregate.  
Another issue to consider in determin-
ing value is that individual circumstances 
can influence the dollar amount people 
can attach to value. For example, low 
and modest income individuals may find 
that even modest cost sharing can place 
some benefits out of reach, while higher 
income individuals will not be deterred by 
even significant cost sharing. Individuals 
with significant health care needs that 
require frequent services may also be more 
cost-sensitive than individuals with few 
health needs, and yet it may be more cost 
effective to encourage them to receive 
services. Creating benefit structures for 
different groups will take great discipline. 
Policymakers developing future insurance 
designs need to consider how to target cost 
sharing differentially for at-risk groups who 
struggle even with coverage.19 
More Information Is Needed
While policymakers can shape multiple 
innovative benefit designs, resources 
used in doing so will not be well spent 
unless appropriate targets are identified in 
advance. Shaping benefits to work in con-
cert with an efficient delivery system and 
a payment system with appropriate incen-
tives will be a challenge and will require 
more information. Currently, there is a 
critical lack of information on high and low 
value services, which is needed to assist 
consumers in making what will likely be 
difficult trade-offs. Also needed, but more 
difficult to produce, is information on who 
benefits from particular treatments. 
Information must then reach providers and 
consumers must be educated to make high 
value health care choices. One challenge 
is reaching consensus among the provider 
community on what constitutes high qual-
ity care. Even more challenging may be 
creating the right incentives to encourage 
individuals to make the hard decisions 
about services and care for which they are 
willing to pay. 
Although provocative research from the 
Dartmouth group suggests that 30 percent 
of care is of low value, identifying that low 
value care will be difficult.  It will require 
studies of the effectiveness of new treat-
ments as well as of existing treatments that 
are an accepted part of care delivery but 
have never been subjected to research on 
effectiveness.  In addition, it will require 
the ability to target those individuals who 
derive the most benefit from those treat-
ments.
Information on the resources used and 
benefits achieved for alternative treatments 
exists,20 although certainly additional stud-
ies will be necessary.  However simply 
researching resource allocation will not 
be sufficient. What is missing is a mecha-
nism for applying the results of these 
studies, including discouraging the use of 
low-value services. The recent American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
created a Federal Coordinating Council for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research; in 
addition to coordinating federal expendi-
tures, the Council will make recommenda-
tions regarding infrastructure needs for 
comparative effectiveness research. While 
this Council is not directly mandated to 
examine how the information from com-
parative effectiveness research can be 
translated into insurance design, it is clear 
that such an effort is needed. Their efforts 
will likely use a consensus process to 
ensure their recommendations are socially 
and politically acceptable. 
While comparative effectiveness research 
is clearly one tool that policymakers can 
use, it will not be sufficient on its own. 
Benefit design, including cost-sharing, will 
be important as will other policy levers, 
such as provider reimbursement. Indeed, 
it will be politically challenging to change 
behavior, especially when large dollars are 
at stake. However, the need to control the 
rapid growth in health care costs makes 
this necessary.  
Conclusion
Benefit design is an important tool that is 
likely to be used in reforming the health 
care system.  Payers and insurers have 
developed and used a number of tools to 
better rationalize care.  Early tools were 
mostly administrative, and included prior 
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approval and second opinions. More 
recently, tools have been developed to 
make consumers more aware of health 
care costs and to provide incentives for 
high value care. VBID is one tool that has 
been used to incent high value care, but 
it has mostly been used in the context of 
encouraging the use of certain pharma-
ceuticals for treating chronic conditions 
through reductions in cost sharing. While 
the potential exists for expanding VBID, 
including the development of designs that 
discourage the use of low clinical effec-
tiveness, identifying those therapies and 
appropriately targeting incentives will be 
challenging. Further, VBID is likely to 
be most effective at incenting the point 
of entry into the health care system or 
removing barriers to compliance with 
clinical recommendations; it is less likely 
to be effective at countering physician rec-
ommendations. Thus, benefit design strat-
egies are likely to be most effective when 
they are paired with other policies, such as 
payment and delivery system reform.
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